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CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENTS IN JAPAN:  
A COMMENT ON THE ROLE OF PRECEDENT 
SHIGENORI MATSUI  
INTRODUCTION 
Japan is a civil law country, and the precedent of the Supreme Court is 
not binding on either the Supreme Court itself or lower courts. Judges are 
supposed to return to the text of the statute for each legal dispute and 
apply the rules to specific cases. Judicial decisions are not ―law‖ to be 
applied by the courts.
1
 
Despite this assumption, judges have followed the precedent of the 
Supreme Court most of the time. The Supreme Court will follow its 
precedent in normal situations, and the lower courts will usually follow the 
precedent of the Supreme Court as well. Thus, although the precedents are 
not legally binding, they have a de facto binding power.
2
 
In this Comment, I will focus on constitutional law precedents to 
illustrate the Supreme Court of Japan’s approach toward its own 
precedent.
3
 As Professor Itoh pointed out in his Article, the theory of 
precedent may be a convenient measure to justify or rationalize the 
outcome the Supreme Court has already reached.
4
 Yet, precedent plays a 
very important role in constitutional adjudication, constraining the 
decision making of the Supreme Court.  
 
 
  Professor of Law, University of British Columbia. L.L.B (1978), Kyoto University; L.L.M. 
(1980), Kyoto University; J.S.D. (1986), Stanford Law School; L.L.D. (2000) Kyoto University. 
 1. NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION] 374 (4th ed. 2007); TOSHIHIKO NONAKA, 
MUTSUO NAKAMURA, KAZUYUKI TAKAHASHI & KATSUTOSHI TAKAMI, KENPŌ I 
[CONSTITUTION I] 13 (4th ed. 1996); HIDEKI SHIBUTANI, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION] 666 (2007); 
MIYOKO TSUJIMURA, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION] 17 (3d ed. 2008); NORIHO URABE, KENPŌGAKU 
KYOUSHITU [STUDIES ON THE CONSTITUTION] 327–28 (rev. ed. 2000). 
 2. Some commentators argue that, given the ambiguity of the de facto binding effect, it is better 
to acknowledge that precedents are legally binding in Japan. KOUJI SATŌ, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION] 
27 (3d ed. 1995); HIDENORI TOMATSU, KENPŌ SOSHŌ [CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION] 398–401 
(2d ed. 2008). However, many disagree, especially with respect to the binding effect upon lower 
courts, since the Japanese Supreme Court has the power to nominate lower court judges for 
reappointment and practically controls them. YOUICHI HIGUCHI, KENPŌ I [CONSTITUTION I] 510 
(1998). 
 3. According to the Saibanshohō [Judiciary Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 10, only the grand 
bench can make a judgment inconsistent with the previous judgment of the Supreme Court in its 
―interpretation and application of the Constitution‖ and other statutes. As a result, the petty bench 
cannot overturn the precedent of the Supreme Court.  
 4. Hiroshi Itoh, The Role of Precedent at Japan’s Supreme Court, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1631 
(2011). 
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A. Precedents of the Supreme Court 
The precedents of the Supreme Court are tremendous authority for later 
Supreme Court inquiries. After the Supreme Court established the 
―purpose and effect test‖ to determine the permissibility of government 
involvement with Shinto under the separation of state and religion 
principle in the Tsu City Ground-breaking Ceremony Case,
5
 for instance, 
the Supreme Court has consistently applied this purpose and effect test in 
subsequent cases.  
Article 20 of the Japanese Constitution provides for the principle of 
separation of state and religion in addition to protecting freedom of 
religion. At issue in the Tsu City Ground-breaking Ceremony Case was 
the constitutionality of the city’s hosting and using public funds for a 
ground-breaking ceremony by a Shinto priest in accordance with the 
Shinto ceremony style. The Supreme Court held that government 
involvement with religion that has either a purpose of advancing the 
religion or an effect of promoting the religion is precluded by the 
Constitution
6
 It then concluded that hosting the ground-breaking ceremony 
and paying public money was not a constitutional violation because the 
ground-breaking ceremony was commonly practiced before construction.
7
 
The ceremony had neither the purpose nor effect of promoting Shinto.
8
 
The Supreme Court later cited the Tsu City Ground-breaking 
Ceremony Case precedent and applied the purpose and effect test in 
subsequent cases. In one case, the Supreme Court held that the 
participation of Self-Defense Force (SDF) officers in the joint 
enshrinement of a deceased SDF officer at the Shinto shrine, despite 
opposition from the deceased’s wife, did not have the purpose or effect of 
promoting or advancing Shinto.
9
 In another case, the Supreme Court held 
that using public funds to move a memorial stone enshrining deceased 
soldiers, providing property for free use, and allowing the participation of 
school officials in the annual memorial service held at the memorial stone 
did not have the purpose or effect of promoting or advancing Shinto.
10
 The 
 
 
 5. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 13, 1977, Sho 46 (gyo-tsu) no. 69, 31 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 533 (grand bench). 
 6. Id.  
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 1, 1988, Sho 57 (0) no. 902, 42 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 277 (grand bench). 
 10. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 16, 1993, Sho 62 (gyo-tsu) no. 148, 47 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1687 (3d petty bench). 
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Supreme Court also held that providing a public subsidy to the local 
chapter of War Bereaved Association, an association of families of 
deceased soldiers that hosted the annual memorial service at the memorial 
stone, did not have the purpose or effect of advancing or promoting 
Shinto.
11
 However, it was only in the Ehime Tamagushi Case
12
 that the 
Supreme Court applied the purpose and effect test and concluded that the 
mandate of separation of state and religion had been violated. In that case, 
the Supreme Court found that the public spending for tamagushi—a twig 
of the sakaki tree wrapped with folded white paper, which is a religious 
offering to the Shinto shrine—had a deeper involvement with Shinto such 
that it had the effect of promoting Shinto by providing the impression that 
the Shinto shrine is special.
13
 
These cases vividly show the impact of Supreme Court precedent upon 
later Supreme Court decisions. Of the four seperation of state and religion 
cases following the Tsu City Ground-breaking Ceremony Case examined 
above, all were decided using its precedential purpose and effect test, and 
three of the four resulted in the same outcome. Clearly, the Supreme Court 
is likely to follow its precedent if any precedent can be found. 
B. Blindly Following the Precedents? 
However, since the principle of stare decisis is not accepted in Japan, 
judges tend to make no sharp distinction between ratio decidendi and 
obiter dicta. Moreover, judges tend to simply follow the precedent without 
inquiring into the specific fact situations that led to the creation of the 
precedent. In other words, judges have a tendency to ignore the factual 
differences between the case that created the precedent and the case before 
them. 
An example is the Gifu Prefecture Youth Ordinance Case.
14
 At issue 
was the constitutionality of the Gifu Prefecture Youth Protection 
 
 
 11. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 21, 1999, Hei 7 (gyo-tsu) no. 122, 1696 HANREI JIHŌ 
[HANJI] 96 (1st petty bench). 
 12. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1997, Hei 4 (gyo-tsu) no. 56, 51 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1673 (grand bench). 
 13. Id. Later, in the Sorachibuto Shrine Case, the Supreme Court held that providing public land 
for free use by the Shinto Shrine was a violation of the separation of state and religion, but it applied 
the totality of the circumstances test instead of the purpose and effect test. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] 
Jan. 20, 2010, Hei 19 (gyo-tsu) no. 260, 64 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1 (grand 
bench). The Supreme Court did not explain why it did not apply the purpose and effect test and thus 
raised some speculation as to the future of the purpose and effect test. 
 14. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 19, 1989, Sho 62 (A) no. 1462, 43 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 785 (3d petty bench). 
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Ordinance, which banned the use of vending machines to sell books and 
magazines found to be harmful for minors. The ordinance listed books and 
magazines that were either sexually explicit or extremely brutal and were 
harmful for the healthy development of minors, and it prohibited their 
distribution if they were found to be harmful by the governor or if they fell 
into a prohibited category. The defendant company was prosecuted for 
violating this ordinance and challenged its conviction as an infringement 
of the freedom of expression protected in Article 21, paragraph 1 of the 
Constitution, and as a violation of the prohibition on censorship in Article 
21, paragraph 2. The Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s challenge 
with the following holding: 
Among the arguments made by respondent counsel Manabu 
Yamaguchi and counsel Kouji Iguchi, with respect to argument on 
appeal on violation of article 21, paragraph 1 of the Constitution, 
since it is apparent that the ban on selling books harmful to minors 
under article 6, paragraph 2, article 6-6, paragraph 1, main text, 
article 21, paragraph 5 of the Gifu Prefecture Youth Protection 
Ordinance (hereinafter cited as said ordinance) does not violate 
article 21, paragraph 1 of the Constitution in light of each of our 
grand bench precedents (Supreme Court, March 13, 1957, 11 
KEISHŪ 997; Supreme Court, October 15, 1969, 23 KEISHŪ 1239; 
Supreme Court, October 23, 1985, 39 KEISHŪ 413), the argument 
has no merit. With respect to argument on violation of article 21, 
paragraph 2, of the Constitution, since it is apparent that the 
designation of books as harmful to minors under the said ordinance 
is not a prohibited censorship under that paragraph in light of each 
of our grand bench precedents (Supreme Court, December 12, 1984, 
38 MINSHŪ 1308; Supreme Court, June 11, 1986, 40 MINSHŪ 872), 
the argument has no merit . . . .
15
  
However, among the three cases cited as precedent to reject the argument 
that the ban violated Article 21, paragraph 1, the first two were concerned 
with the ban on distribution of obscenity under the Criminal Code,
16
 and 
the third was concerned with the criminal punishment for sexual 
intercourse with minors under a local youth protection ordinance.
17
 None 
 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 13, 1957, Sho 28 (A) no. 1713, 11 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 997 (grand bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 15, 1969, Sho 39 (A) no. 
305, 23 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 1239 (grand bench). 
 17. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 23, 1985, Sho 57 (A) no. 621, 39 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
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of these was concerned with the criminal ban on materials found to be 
harmful to minors. Two cases were also cited as precedent to reject the 
argument that the ban violated Article 21, paragraph 2, but the first was 
concerned with the customs regulation banning importation of obscene 
materials,
18
 and the other was concerned with judicial injunctions against 
publication of materials found to be defamatory.
19
 Neither of these was 
concerned with the power of the governor to designate certain materials as 
harmful to minors and to prohibit their distribution to minors. Nor were 
any of the precedents concerned with the criminal punishment of a 
defendant who violated the ban on distribution of materials designated by 
the governor to be harmful to minors.  
The Gifu Prefecture Youth Ordinance Case holding indicates that the 
Supreme Court has a tendency to rely upon precedent regardless of 
differences in fact situations. In other words, precedent in Japan tends to 
be viewed as a general framework, separated from specific fact situations. 
Since the precedents are not binding, there is no urgent legal necessity to 
distinguish ratio decidendi from obiter dicta. But because of the Japanese 
judges’ de facto reliance on precedent, the tendency to rely upon precedent 
despite the factual differences might give more authoritativeness to the 
precedent.  
C. Overruling the Precedents without Explaining Why 
The Supreme Court sometimes explicitly overturns precedent. In such 
cases, the Supreme Court usually does not explain why overruling 
precedent was necessary, except to express the reasons that the Supreme 
Court now believes in a different conclusion. 
For example, the Supreme Court overturned its precedent in the 
Confiscation of the Third Party Property Case
20
 by holding that the 
defendant could challenge the constitutionality of the government’s 
confiscation of property, which the defendant possessed but was owned by 
a third party, without affording an opportunity for a hearing with the third-
party owner. In a previous decision,
21
 the Supreme Court held that 
 
 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 413 (grand bench). 
 18. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 12, 1984, Sho 57 (gyo-tsu) no. 156, 38 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1308 (grand bench). 
 19. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 11, 1986, Sho 56 (O) no. 609, 40 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 872 (grand bench) 
 20. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 28, 1962, Sho 30 (A) no. 2961, 16 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 1593 (grand bench). 
 21. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 19, 1960, Sho 28 (A) no. 3026, 14 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
  
 
 
 
 
1674 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:1669 
 
 
 
 
defendants should not be allowed to invoke the infringement of the rights 
of a third party to challenge the constitutionality of government action. In 
the subsequent case, the Supreme Court emphasized, however, that when 
confiscation was imposed upon the defendant, it deprived him of the right 
to occupy the property and put him in the position of being held liable for 
damages to the third party, thus justifying the defendant’s ability to 
challenge the confiscation order.
22
 The Supreme Court thus explicitly 
overruled its precedent.
23
 The Supreme Court never explained why it was 
justified in overruling the precedent. 
The Supreme Court also overturned its precedent in the Parricide 
Case
24
 by holding that the parricide provision of the Criminal Code, which 
imposed a heavier penalty against parricide than regular homicide, was 
unconstitutional. The Criminal Code imposed a term of imprisonment of 
no less than three years and up to life imprisonment or the death penalty 
for defendants convicted of regular homicide,
25
 while imposing only life 
imprisonment or the death penalty for defendants convicted of parricide.
26
 
The sentencing judge can choose a specific sentence from these options. If 
there were strong mitigating factors, the judge can impose a sentence of 
imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, and the judge can 
suspend the enforcement of the imprisonment sentence.
27
 A defendant 
convicted of regular homicide thus may not have to go to jail. But with 
respect to a defendant convicted for parricide, the judge cannot choose a 
sentence of imprisonment for a term of not more than three years no 
matter what mitigating factors may exist. A defendant convicted of 
parricide thus must go to jail regardless of mitigating factors. In its 
previous decisions,
28
 the Supreme Court rejected this constitutional 
challenge. Yet, in this case, the majority of the Supreme Court came to 
believe that the penalty imposed on parricide was unreasonably heavier 
than the penalty imposed on regular homicide, since the penalty would not 
allow for a suspension in the enforcement of the sentence regardless of 
 
 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 1574 (grand bench). 
 22. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 28, 1962, Sho 30 (A) no. 2961, 16 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 1593 (grand bench). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Sho 45 (A) no. 1310, 27 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 265 (grand bench).  
 25. KEIHŌ [PEN. C.], art. 199 (amended in 2004 to impose death sentence, life imprisonment, 
or imprisonment for no less than five years). 
 26. Id. art. 200 (deleted in 1995). 
 27. Id. art. 25, para. 1. 
 28. See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 25, 1950, Sho 25 (A) no. 292, 4 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 2126 (grand bench). 
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whether there were significant mitigating factors.
29
 The Supreme Court 
thus explicitly overturned its precedent.
30
  
In the Parricide Case, the Supreme Court listed several reasons for 
reconsideration of the issue: the earlier case that upheld the provision 
indicated a concern that this provision might be too harsh; the Supreme 
Court had denied its application when there were mitigating 
circumstances; this provision, enacted before the Japanese Constitution, 
served the philosophical goal of securing respect for parents by imposing 
heavier criminal punishment, a tradition which came to be rejected in 
many countries; and this provision was not included in the new draft of the 
Criminal Code.
31
 These are the reasons why the Supreme Court came to 
believe it was necessary to give a fresh look at the issue and to come up 
with a new constitutional rule. 
D. Implicitly Overruling? 
Sometimes, the Supreme Court makes a judgment inconsistent with its 
precedent, thereby implicitly overturning it. Such was the Tokyo Public 
Safety Ordinance Case.
32
 Prior to this judgment, the Supreme Court 
upheld the Niigata Prefecture Public Safety Ordinance against an 
allegation of infringement of the freedom of expression in the Niigata 
Prefecture Public Safety Ordinance Case.
33
 The Supreme Court held that 
an advance notification requirement for a public demonstration, as 
opposed to a general permit requirement, could be justified and that the 
government should be allowed to prohibit a demonstration if there was a 
clear and present danger to public safety.
34
 Yet, in the Tokyo Public Safety 
Ordinance Case, the Supreme Court held that the Tokyo Public Safety 
Ordinance was constitutional, even though it was a comprehensive 
advance permit requirement.
35
 The Supreme Court held that the advance 
permit requirement was not much different than the advance notification 
requirement and that the government should be allowed to prohibit the 
 
 
 29. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Sho 45 (A) no. 1310, 27 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 265 (grand bench). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 20, 1960, Sho 35 (A) no. 112, 14 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 1243 (grand bench). 
 33. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 24, 1954, Sho 26 (A) no. 3188, 8 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 1866 (grand bench). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 20, 1960, Sho 35 (A) no. 112, 14 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 1243 (grand bench).  
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demonstration if there was a danger that the public safety might be 
disturbed, since a demonstration is always capable of turning into a riot.
36
 
The Supreme Court never mentioned the Niigata Prefecture Public Safety 
Ordinance Case, but it was apparent that the Supreme Court implicitly 
overturned the precedent. This decision failed to justify the practical 
overruling of the precedent. 
The Supreme Court sometimes gives a new interpretation to precedent 
and, in so doing, implicitly overrules the precedent. The Overseas Voters 
Case
37
 is a typical case. It was settled in the previous Voting at Home 
Case
38
 that the public could seek damages against the government if a 
statute was found to be unconstitutional. The action of the Diet is a 
government action that could trigger governmental liability.
39
 The 
question was when damages could be recovered. The Voting at Home 
Case held that damages would be awarded only when the Diet violated the 
unequivocal language of the Constitution, a highly exceptional situation 
that is hard to imagine.
40
 The Supreme Court then concluded that 
abolishing and failing to reinstate a voting system that had allowed 
seriously disabled voters to cast votes at home was not a sufficiently 
blatant violation of the unequivocal language of the Constitution to permit 
a recovery of damages.
41
 Lawyers and academics believed that this 
holding practically precluded the public from seeking damages against the 
government because of the conduct of the Diet.
42
 In the Overseas Voters 
Case, the Diet failed to provide the opportunity for voters living abroad to 
vote; these voters did not have local addresses and were totally excluded 
from voting before 1998. The 1998 amendment gave them an opportunity 
to participate in proportional representation elections, but they were still 
excluded from voting in election districts. The Supreme Court held that 
the total exclusion of overseas voters from the election before 1998 and 
their exclusion from district elections after 1998 were both 
unconstitutional.
43
 Then, the Supreme Court granted a damages award to 
 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 14, 2005, Hei 13 (gyo-tsu) no. 82, 59 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 2087 (grand bench). 
 38. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 21, 1985, Sho 53 (0) no. 1240, 39 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1512 (1st petty bench). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 369 (criticizing the Supreme Court as practically precluding the 
possibility of reviewing the constitutionality of the inaction of the Diet); TOMATSU, supra note 2, 
at 156. 
 43. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 14, 2005, Hei 13 (gyo-tsu) no. 82, 59 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
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all the plaintiffs, overseas voters, insisting that the damages award should 
be granted when the Diet’s conduct is an apparent violation of 
constitutional rights or when the Diet fails to pass legislative measures 
necessary to secure the exercise of constitutional rights without 
justification for a long time where such measures are indispensable.
44
 The 
Supreme Court then added that the thrust of the Voting at Home Case was 
not different from this holding.
45
 The Supreme Court thereby radically 
reinterpreted, and practically overruled, its precedent to expand the scope 
of cases where damages may be recovered. 
E. Overruling Due to Mere Change in the Composition of the Supreme 
Court? 
The overruling in the All Forest and Agricultural Public Workers, 
Police Office Act Amendment Opposition Case
46
 is more controversial. In 
Japan, all public workers, regardless of the nature of their jobs or their 
ranks, are prohibited from striking,
47
 despite the constitutional guarantee 
of the right to strike in Article 28 of the Constitution. There is also 
criminal punishment for those who conspire, solicit, advocate, or plan such 
an illegal strike.
48
 The earlier All Postal Workers, Tokyo Central Post 
Office Case
49
 involved the criminal prosecution of union leaders of postal 
workers, who were public corporation workers, for soliciting an illegal 
strike. With respect to public corporation workers, the Public Corporation 
and State Managed Company Workers Labor Relation Act used to have a 
prohibition against strikes,
50
 but no criminal punishment was imposed on 
 
 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 2087 (grand bench).  
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 25, 1973, Sho 43 (A) no. 2780, 27 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 547 (grand bench). 
 47. Kokka kōmuinhō [National Public Workers Act], Law No. 120 of 1947, art. 98, para. 2; 
Chihō kōmuinhō [Local Public Workers Act], Law No. 261 of 1950, art. 37.  
 48. Kokka kōmuinhō [National Public Workers Act], Law No. 120 of 1947, art. 110, para. 17; 
Chihō kōmuinhō [Local Public Workers Act], Law No. 261 of 1950, art. 61, para. 4. 
 49. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 26, 1966, Sho 39 (A) no. 296, 20 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 901 (grand bench). 
 50. Kōkyōkigyōtaitō rōdōkankeihō [Public Corporation and State Managed Company Workers 
Labor Relations Act], Law No. 257 of 1948, art. 17. This statute was originally enacted as 
Kōkyōkigyōtai rōdōkankeihō [State Managed Company Workers Labor Relations Act] in 1948. In 
1986, it was renamed as Kokueikigyō rōdōkankeihō [State Managed Company Workers Labor 
Relations Act]. In 2001, it was again renamed as Kokueikigyō oyobi tokutei dokuritsugyoseihōjin no 
rōdōkankei nikansuru hōritsu [Act Concerning Labor Relations in State Managed Company and 
Specified Independent Administrative Corporation], and in 2003 it became Tokutei 
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those who organized a strike. The government thus decided to impose 
criminal punishment on those union organizers under the Postal Act, 
which prohibited the refusal to perform post service.
51
 In that case, the 
Supreme Court held that the right to strike could only be deprived after 
balancing the protection of the rights of public workers and the necessity 
of protecting the public.
52
 The Supreme Court also held that criminal 
penalties should be minimized, allowing for punishment of the union 
leaders who solicited the illegal strike only when their strike was not for a 
legitimate purpose, when the strike was accompanied with violence, or 
when the strike was continued for an improperly long time.
53
 This holding 
was praised for its sensitive attitude toward the rights of public workers.
54
 
The Supreme Court applied this holding to local public workers
55
 and then 
to national public workers
56
 as well. 
Yet, seven years later, in the All Agricultural and Forest Workers, 
Police Office Act Amendment Opposition Case, the Supreme Court 
radically changed its attitude. In this case, the leaders of All Agricultural 
and Forest Workers, a union of the national public workers, were 
prosecuted for soliciting an illegal strike under the National Public 
Workers Act. The Supreme Court held that the strike by the public 
workers was inconsistent with the status and public nature of their jobs 
and might seriously impact the public by suspending public services.
57
 The 
Supreme Court also held that the strike by the public workers undermined 
the principle of representative government since it could force the 
legislature to address the employment relationship under pressure.
58
 The 
Supreme Court rejected the limiting construction on the criminal 
punishment for the solicitation of illegal strikes and concluded that union 
leaders could be punished.
59
 The Supreme Court thus overturned the 
precedent that followed the All Postal Workers, Tokyo Central Post Office 
 
 
dokuritsugyoseihōjinno no rōdōkankei nikansuru hōritsu [Act on Labor Relationship of Specified 
Independent Administrative Corporation].  
 51. Yūbinhō [Postal Act], Law No. 165 of 1947, art. 79, para. 1.  
 52. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 26, 1966, Sho 39 (A) no. 296, 20 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 901 (grand bench) 
 53. Id.  
 54. ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 263; TSUJIMURA, supra note 1, at 320. 
 55. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1969, Sho 41 (A) no. 401, 23 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 305 (grand bench). 
 56. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1969, Sho 41 (A) no. 1129, 23 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 685 (grand bench). 
 57. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 25, 1973 Sho 43 (A) no. 2780, 27 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 547 (grand bench). 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id.  
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Case and gave a limiting construction to the National Public Workers 
Act,
60
 while practically overturning the All Postal Workers, Tokyo Central 
Post Office Case decision. Later, the Supreme Court applied its new ruling 
to local public workers
61
 and then to public corporation workers,
62
 
explicitly overturning the All Postal Workers, Tokyo Central Post Office 
Case. 
Since the purpose of the strike in the All Agricultural and Forest 
Workers, Police Office Act Amendment Opposition Case was to oppose an 
amendment to the Police Office Act, which is not related to employee 
welfare, criminally punishing the leaders was not precluded under the 
framework of the All Postal Workers, Tokyo Central Post Office Case. 
Yet, the fact that the Supreme Court went on to both reexamine the whole 
framework and to implicitly overturn the holding suggested the adoption 
of a totally different constitutional jurisprudence by the new majority. 
Minority Justices in the All Agricultural and Forest Workers, Police Office 
Act Amendment Opposition Case strongly criticized the practical 
overruling of the All Postal Workers, Tokyo Central Post Office Case as 
unnecessary and pointed out that the majority opinion was nothing but the 
minority position rejected by the Supreme Court in that decision. This 
strongly suggests that the overruling was a result of a mere change in the 
composition of the Supreme Court.
63
 It is apparent that this overruling was 
the result of strong criticism from conservative politicians in the ruling 
party in the Diet and the change in the composition of the Supreme Court 
that resulted from these criticisms. Academic commentators generally 
sided with the minority and criticized the Supreme Court for its overruling 
of the All Postal Workers, Tokyo Central Post Office Case.
64
  
 
 
 60. Id., overruling Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1969, Sho 41 (A) no. 401, 23 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 305 (grand bench).  
 61. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 21, 1976, Sho 44 (A) no. 1275, 30 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 1178 (grand bench). 
 62. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 4, 1977, Sho 44 (A) no. 2571, 31 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 182 (grand bench). 
 63. Id. (Jiro Tanaka, J., opinion). 
 64. TOMATSU, supra note 2, at 371, 372; TSUJIMURA, supra note 1, at 322. 
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CONCLUSION  
As Professor Itoh noted in his Article, respect for precedent might be 
viewed as ―another means by which the judiciary attempts to justify and 
rationalize conclusions prestructured by its deeply ingrained attitudes.‖65 
The Supreme Court follows its precedent when it is satisfied with it, but 
the Supreme Court is willing to modify or overturn precedent when it 
finds itself dissatisfied with it. There is no feeling among Justices that they 
have to follow precedent, even when they are somewhat unhappy with it, 
so long as there is no compelling reason for changing it. Yet, precedent 
does play a very significant role in constitutional adjudication even though 
it is not legally binding. When the Supreme Court overrules its precedent, 
it at least has to persuasively explain why it has overturned its precedent. 
Otherwise, the Supreme Court might face strong criticism from dissenters 
and academic commentators. To that extent, precedents constrain the 
Supreme Court.
66
  
 
 
 65. Itoh, supra note 4, at1666. Political scientists generally point out that precedent does not have 
a strong impact upon the outcome of a decision. See generally Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, 
The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes of United States Supreme Court Justices, 40 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 971 (1996). Relying upon these works, Frederick Schauer argues that precedent rarely matters in 
the Supreme Court of the United States. Frederick Schauer, Has Precedent Ever Really Mattered in the 
Supreme Court?, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 381, 392 (2007). However, William A. Edmundson criticizes 
Schauer as exaggerating the lack of impact. William A. Edmundson, Schauer on Precedent in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 403 (2007). I tend to share the view of Professor Edmundson. 
See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional 
Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570 (2001); Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of 
Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1173 (2006). But see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme 
Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis Require Adherence to the Supreme Court’s Current 
Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1165 (2008) (arguing for the overruling of the current 
doctrine of stare decisis). To what extent the Supreme Court should give respect to precedent is a 
different matter. See generally Tom Hardy, Has Mighty Casey Struck Out?: Societal Reliance and the 
Supreme Court’s Modern Stare Decisis Analysis, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 4 (2007) (supporting the 
court’s consideration of societal reliance in considering whether to follow precedents); Randy J. Kozel, 
Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411 (2010) (proposing to reformulate 
stare decisis by directly focusing on reliance interest). 
 66. I share a view that it is better to acknowledge that the precedents of the Supreme Court are 
legally binding in Japan. SHIGENORI MATSUI, NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [JAPANESE CONSTITUTION] 33 
(3d ed. 2007). After all, respect for precedents is indispensable in any society that adheres to the rule 
of law. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992). Moreover, it is 
frequently suggested that the binding power of the constitutional precedents is not strong, even in the 
United States. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405–07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). There is no critical difference in the practical effect of the precedents between the United 
States and Japan. 
 
